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ABSTRACT 
 
To date, Singapore’s regionalization strategy has been applied in China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam through the 
establishment of industrial parks. The nexus between these ‘clones’ is the implantation of Singapore’s positive 
business ethos amidst more uncertain host environments. Leveraging on world-class infrastructure, efficiency and 
location-specific advantages, these industrial parks present themselves as low-cost investment enclaves. This paper1 
focuses on the regional industrial development project assembled, administered and promoted by the sovereign 
national governments of Singapore and Vietnam. Using in-depth case studies, it examines the push-pull factors for 
firms with different structures. It finds that progress in this privileged foreign investment zone remains stymied by 
particular challenges and dependencies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The city-state of Singapore has continually sought to overcome its resource limitations by extending its economic 
hinterland beyond its national boundaries. Singapore’s global outreach, supported by constant economic reform and 
its competitive strengths, has allowed it to achieve remarkable economic growth in a relatively short span of time. 
To fuel economic development, the city-state began to make deliberate efforts to woo foreign investors with low-
labor costs in the mid-1960s [4].This influx of investment remained the engine of growth until cheaper 
manufacturing locations that emerged in developing Asian countries eroded Singapore’s competitive edge. 
Subsequently, the government initiated a major industrial restructuring, which saw Singapore transforming itself 
into a hub for MNEs engaged in higher value-added manufacturing activities. By the late 1980s, Singapore boasted 
world-class infrastructure, an educated and highly skilled workforce and excellent business support. After a major 
recession in the mid-1980s exposed Singapore’s vulnerability arising from its over-dependence on foreign capital, 
government strategy began to shift its focus from drawing foreign investment to encouraging local firms to venture 
into the region and develop an ‘external wing’ [21]. Henceforth, Singapore embarked on its regionalization program. 
 
Capitalizing on the liberalization of foreign investment controls and high growth rates in the Asian region, 
Singapore looked to develop its ‘external wing’ by investing in countries across Asia [12]. Singapore’s 
regionalization program involved the establishment of industrial parks in emerging economies in the Asian region 
which replicated the business environment found in Singapore [14] [18]. These industrial parks were marketed as a 
propitious synergy of location-specific advantages and Singapore’s strengths in infrastructural development and 
management. The industrial parks were established, based on the belief that they would allow Singapore-based 
MNEs to maintain access to low-cost, resource-abundant centers for their resource-dependent operations, while 
conducting higher value-added operations in Singapore. Singapore’s conduciveness for high-end operations and its 
strategic links to low-cost centers in the region would then make it an attractive hub for global corporations. 
 
VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
 
The Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park is Singapore’s flagship industrial park project in Vietnam. First proposed in 
March 1994 by the then Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, and Singapore’s Prime Minister, Goh Chok 
Tong, VSIP was officially launched in 1996 [5]. As with earlier projects, such as the Batamindo Industrial Park 
(BIP) in Indonesia and the Suzhou-Wuxi experiments in China, Singapore looked to ‘export’ and synergize its 
efficient infrastructure and management expertise with competitive cost structures arising from location-specific 
resources in another Asian environment [1] [14]. 
 
VSIP is located in Bin Duong Province, 17 km north of Ho Chi Minh City, and within a 40-minute drive from the 
international airport and seaports. The self-contained 1000-hectare park boasts a comprehensive suite of facilities 
such as prepared land plots, ready-built factories, and an on-site customs unit which allows for customs procedures 
and documentation to be done within the Park, as well as customs inspections within the tenant’s factories. Tenants 
also have access to a ready pool of low-cost labor from a 200,000 working population available within a 15-km 
radius [20]. In addition, the Vietnam-Singapore Technical Training Centre (VSTTC) provides skilled manpower. 
Established in 1998, VTTSC is an S$9.5 million three-way project between the Singapore and Vietnam governments 
and VSIP. For the first five years of VTTSC’s operations, VSIP was given priority for its graduates. These facilities 
are further complemented by Singapore management know-how and quality infrastructural support, allowing VSIP 
to offer convenient, ‘one-stop’ service to its tenants. 
 
In addition, to incorporate lesson learnt from its industrial park projects in China – hampered progress during their 
development phase due to uneven distribution of ownership and responsibility and insufficient identity of interest 
between the working parties on the ground [19] – Singapore made deliberate efforts to foster strong collaboration 
with local authorities. VSIP is jointly developed by a Singapore consortium led by SembCorp Industries2 and 
Becamex, a Vietnamese state-owned enterprise. The former holds a controlling stake of 51%. To prevent the 
perception that the VSIP was a partnership imposed upon by the central government, A Management Board3, 
chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Binh Duong Province People's Committee, was established at the inception of 
the park.  
 
Prior to the launch of VSIP in May 1995, a total of 13 international companies with investments worth US$80 
million reportedly indicated their interest in the Park [1]. These pioneer tenants include 3M, Sandoz, Sakata Inx, 
Godrej (India), Liwayway Food Industries (Philippines) and a mix of Singapore manufacturers like ST Automotive, 
Star Chemicals and Hwa Hup. Many companies have acknowledged the Singapore Economic Development Board’s 
efforts to market the park and assist tenants in their set-up process. By 1998, investments from the 30 tenants in 
VSIP amounted to US$370 million. In the following year, VSIP saw an increase of tenants to 33, with aggregate 
investment exceeding US$400 million. Then, VSIP had tenants from 10 different countries, investing in a wide 
range of industries, including food, electrical and electronics, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, specialty materials, 
consumer goods and light industries. Today, investment commitments in VSIP are valued at over US$600 million 
from 124 tenants, 80 of which are in operation. 24,000 jobs have been created, with the number expected to rise to 
40,000 (Table 1). Net profit for 2003 stood at US$4 million and is likely to increase to at least US$6million in 2004 
[3]. 
 
TABLE 1: VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
OPERATIONAL STATISTICS (SEPTEMBER 2003) 
 
General Information 
Investment by Developer 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up 
Investment by Tenants 
Annual Export Value (for 2002) 
No. of Employees 
US$600 million 
124 
300 hectares 
> US$1 billion 
> US$2 billion 
24,000 
 
Source: SembCorp Parks Management. 
 VSIP has a list of ‘priority’ industries, which adheres closely to the official list of preferred industries4. However, 
these priorities industries in VSIP are not meant to complement Singapore’s economic development. Hence, VSIP is 
less selective of target industries, as can be observed from the diverse mix of tenants. The sector mix ranges from 
electronics to light industries to pharmaceuticals (Table 2) while the tenant mix reflects the importance of Asian 
MNEs (Table3). 
  
TABLE 2: VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
TENANT PROFILE BY SECTOR (SEPTEMBER 2003) 
 
Sector Percent Sector Percent 
Electronics 11 Consumer goods 14 
Food 9 Logistics 14 
Light industries 20 Parts and components 10 
Pharmaceuticals 9 Others 13 
 
Source: SembCorp Parks Management 
 
TABLE 3: VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
TENANT PROFILE BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (SEPTEMBER 2003) 
 
Country Percent 
Singapore 24 
Japan 21 
Taiwan 17 
Other Asian Countries 22 
US and Europe 16 
 
Source: SembCorp Parks Management. 
 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm [6] [7] [8] [9] proffered an analytical framework to examine the pattern and extent of 
activities of firms engaged in value-added activities beyond their national boundaries. It sought to explain the ability 
and willingness of firms to serve markets and delve into the reasons behind their choice of exploiting this advantage 
through foreign production rather than domestic production, exports or portfolio resource flows. The eclectic 
paradigm postulates that foreign investment will only occur if it is advantageous to combine spatially transferable 
intermediate products produced in the home country, with at least some immobile factor endowments or other 
intermediate products in another country [8]. Specifically, the configuration of ownership-specific advantages, 
internalization-incentive advantages, and location-specific advantages (OLI) determines international production 
and its nature.  
 
The framework goes on to assert that the import of each advantage in the OLI triumvirate and the relationship 
between them varies across firms, industries and countries and is context-specific. What is common in most firms, 
however, is the acquisition of the O advantages through exploitation of firm-specific resources, and the simultaneous 
procurement of I advantages through the diminution of transaction costs. As firms’ core competencies become 
increasingly knowledge-intensive, MNEs seek locations (economic and institutional facilities) that best utilize their 
core competencies.  
 
More recent literature has widened the ambit of the eclectic paradigm to include deliberations on the role of 
infrastructure in the attraction of new investments [13]; the presence of immobile clusters of complementary value-
added activities [11], and the transactional benefits of spatial proximity [17]. 
 
Theories, from the perspective of the firm, have further argued that not only should the production process be 
viewed as a value chain [10] [15] [16] [17], but also, firms should identify comparative or location-specific 
advantages unique to each country/territory, which will serve to complement the competitive and firm-specific 
advantages specific to their core functions. Furthermore, according to rationalization theory, firms should situate 
their operations in different locations to capitalize on the comparative advantages offered in each location. 
Singapore’s involvement in VSIP represents an effort to synergize superior infrastructure and efficient and 
transparent management practices, with the location-specific advantages of Vietnam. The underlying intention is to 
create an enclave, within a more uncertain environment, where firms can exploit location-specific advantages with 
greater ease and security. 
 
VSIP aims to provide location-specific advantages for firms with manufacturing operations, particularly those that 
look to gain easier access to the Vietnamese and neighboring markets. The Park offers abundant unskilled labor and 
other local resources at low cost, and proximity to target markets. These pull factors are enhanced and strengthened 
by world-class infrastructure within the park, strong commitment and support from the local authorities and growing 
bilateral economic cooperation between Singapore and Vietnam. The envisaged product of this combination is an 
industrial park, distinct amidst the competition, which presents itself as attractive investment enclave. 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Case Studies 
 
To gain deeper insight into our study, and a micro perspective on the dynamics behind the decisions of tenants from 
various kinds of firms, we present case studies of four selected firms in VSIP (Table 4). 
 
TABLE 4: SUMMARY INFORMATION OF CASE STUDY FIRMS 
 
Company Country Industry Employee Strength 
A India Pharmaceuticals Less than 50 
B France Electronics Less than 50 
C Singapore Paper Products More than 100 
D Philippines Snack Foods More than 600 
 
Case A – Pharmaceuticals 
 
Company A is a wholly Indian-owned pharmaceutical manufacturer in VSIP. In terms of the production of 
pharmaceutical products, India is often regarded as second only to the United States. 
 
Recognizing the immense potential and minimal competition in the Vietnam market, the company entered Vietnam 
in the early 1990s. Despite the company’s venture into the country in 1994, it only sited its manufacturing 
operations in VSIP in 1999. Actual production began shortly after the company entered VSIP. Presently, the facility 
has less than 50 employees.  
 
Apart from access to the domestic market, the company selected VSIP because of the world-class infrastructure 
provided by the ‘Singapore-styled’ park, such as water supply that met international standards. Furthermore, 
operating from VSIP allows the company to bypass the regulatory barriers it faced previously. It can now import 
machinery and raw materials like chemicals with greater ease. The company also cites the proactive park 
administration as a pull factor. The park administration has helped the company solve its problems, one of which is 
the recruitment of skilled personnel. 
 
On the other hand, Company A does face constraints in production. First, it experiences delays due to difficulties in 
obtaining various licenses, permits and inspections before production can commence. This may be partly due to the 
nature of their products. The main problem Company A faces is labor-related. While there is an abundant pool of 
low-cost low-skilled labor, there is a shortage of skilled personnel. To increase the level of training for its employees 
and also circumvent the lack of training facilities for pharmaceutical manufacturing, the company regularly flies in 
skilled technicians from India to provide training for the operation of technologically advanced machines. 
Consequently, the company has been forced to pay wages that are even higher than that in India and is likely to 
continue with a small workforce. 
 
Case B – Electronics 
 
Company B is a French based global leader in manufacturing electrical equipment. The company’s main clients 
come from the field of energy, industry, infrastructure and construction. It has over 70,000 staff in 130 countries 
over 5 continents. Currently, it has three operations in Vietnam, representative offices in Ho Chi Minh City and 
Hanoi, and the manufacturing facility in VSIP. The company hopes to participate in local contracts and projects 
through its domestic presence.  
 
Company B established operations in VSIP in 1999. Since then, it has maintained a small facility with less than 50 
employees. The operations in Vietnam target mainly the domestic market, with some exports to the rest of the 
ASEAN.  
 
While low-skilled labor is readily available at low cost in Vietnam, managerial professionals, as well as research and 
development personnel are scarce. This made the company’s efforts to expand existing operations through 
increasing product offerings, above the current range of switchgears to circuit breakers, more difficult. VSIP was 
able to improve this situation somewhat, by providing graduates from VSTTC. These graduates are generally 
preferred to others because they are better trained. The extensive use of Vietnamese also poses a constraint for 
Company B. As changes in government policies are made in Vietnamese, the company finds difficult to relate them 
to current business operations. Furthermore, this creates the perception that government policies are relatively 
unfriendly to foreigners. 
 
Despite these issues and the premium charged by VSIP, the company is considering expansion in its existing 
location in VSIP to increase its business volume. This is due to the high sunk costs incurred in setting up current 
operations that have made moving to another location too costly.  
 
Case C – Paper Products 
 
Company C is a wholly Singapore owned firm, with its parent company publicly listed in Singapore. The company 
manufactures paper products, such as paper for cigarettes and carton boxes. Currently, it has five factories in 
Vietnam, one of which is located in VSIP. The factories are strategically located across Vietnam to reduce transport 
costs and improve the company’s distribution network. Together, the five manufacturing facilities allow the 
company to capture about 30% of the local market. 
 
The decision to locate in VSIP was due to the Park’s Singapore connection, as well as its proximity to Ho Chi Minh 
City, where Company C’s marketing operations are situated. The VSIP operation employs over 100 employees and 
targets mainly the domestic market. Only about 30% of the products are exported, mostly to ASEAN.  
 
World-class and reliable infrastructure, including stable power facilities was a major pull factor for Company C. 
Recently, however, the company experienced disruptions in power supply that proved to be quite costly. In 
response, it requested installing its own backup generators but was rejected. As such, what was initially a key pull 
factor has become a major constraint. In addition to unstable power supply, the company also faced difficulties in 
importing the machinery required for its operations, particularly older machines. As the production process is fairly 
automated, the company requires skilled workers to operate the machines. Despite paying above market rates of 
US$30, there is still a shortage of such skilled workers, and there is a trend towards high labor turnover rate. 
 
Case D – Snack Foods 
 
Company C is a leading snack food manufacturer based in the Philippines. Although still a family-owned business, 
it is aggressively expanding in Asia, taking on global brands such as Frito Lay’s. Company C began constructing its 
factory in VSIP in 1997, and currently employs over 600 workers. Apart from manufacturing, the company engages 
in product development within its VSIP operations, such as product tasting by employees in the factory to suit local 
preferences. In addition, the company has an administrative and marketing operation in Ho Chi Minh City. 
 
The decision to locate in Vietnam was made in 1996, when Vietnam still appeared politically unstable and 
backward. Unlike other investors, Company C was not deterred due to its prior experience with infrastructural 
problems faced by emerging economies. In addition, these problems were somewhat alleviated by the more reliable 
and quality infrastructure contained in VSIP. 
 
Company C’s operations can be considered one of the more successful amongst all those in VSIP. The company was 
able to turn a profit within its first year of operations, and currently has an annual turnover of over US$10 million. 
The operations in VSIP mainly serve the local market, with some exports to the Middle East, as well as to the rest of 
ASEAN. Partially completed products are also exported back to the Philippines. 
 
Being one of the first-movers to enter the Vietnam snack food industry, the company has become the dominant 
snack food producer after successfully taking away market share from the small, inefficient domestic competitors. 
The company’s success in garnering domestic market share in Vietnam is attributed to the efficient production 
methods, as well as its good relationships with distributors. 
 
Although the Vietnamese market is comparatively younger, Company C’s Vietnam operations have proved to be 
more profitable than its operations in its home-market. This is attributed to the low labor costs, which is 
approximately half of that in the Philippines, and, interestingly, the denomination of the currency, which allows the 
company to charge a higher price for some of its products in Vietnam.  
 
Unlike many other tenants from VSIP, the company does not face serious industrial relations issues, despite its large 
number of employees. The main problems the company faces are external, such as distribution problems. The 
manufacturing facility in VSIP is the sole supplier meeting the needs of the entire domestic market. The poor road 
conditions in Vietnam, especially during rainy seasons, hamper the transportation of products. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Like its Chinese and Indonesian counterparts, VSIP was marketed as a low-cost manufacturing centre, supported by 
excellent, ‘Singapore-styled’ infrastructure and management expertise. This winning combination of pull factors 
was supposed to give the park an edge over its competitors. While our case studies show that the companies did 
choose to locate their operations in VSIP because they were attracted to the purported advantages, they also suggest 
that these supposed advantages have not always been a reality. Furthermore, the Park’s limitations have restricted 
expansion and diversification of some operations. Overall, the case studies indicate that VSIP is primarily suited for 
manufacturing operations engaging low-skilled labor. 
 
The key impetus driving the case study companies to locate in VSIP was easy access to the domestic market. As 
stated by Company B and Company C, greater proximity to the growing Vietnamese market and Ho Chi Minh City 
is crucial to because of the need to gain a strong foothold and overcome communication and transportation 
inefficiencies.  The efficiency and transparency associated with ‘Singapore-style’ infrastructure and administration, 
together with the one-stop service offered were also significant deciding factors investment in the Park.  
 
On the other hand, VSIP does have limitations in meeting its tenant’s needs. As reflected by most of the case study 
companies, there is a shortage of manpower equipped with a higher set of skills. Although unskilled labor is in 
abundance at low-cost, managerial professionals and skilled workers required for sophisticated manufacturing 
operations or research and development are scarce. The VSTTC, though providing a trained labor pool, only offered 
fixed skill-sets that failed to cater to the diverse needs of the tenants. As such, many tenants have been forced to 
either incur higher cost to train locals and hire skilled professionals at a premium, or face voids in positions 
requiring labor expertise. This constraint has hindered some of the case study firms’ efforts to expand operations to 
include activities higher up the value chain, resulting in the tendency for smaller operations for companies engaged 
in high-end manufacturing. 
 
The less common constraints faced by the case study companies suggest VSIP’s limitations in serving tenants from a 
spectrum of industries and its failure to deliver efficient infrastructure and administration. For instance, Company A, 
a pharmaceutical, cited difficulties in obtaining permits, licenses and inspections as a constraint, hinting insufficient 
support for higher-end manufacturing. Company C, producing paper products, raised the issue of unstable power 
supply and the delay and unwillingness on the part of park administration to resolve the problem. As such, it is 
arguable that VSIP has not lived up to its initial promise to provide reliable one-stop service within a self-contained 
environment.  
 
Nevertheless, VSIP has managed to provide some purported location-specific advantages such as abundant, low-cost 
labor.  Company D, for example, has enjoyed larger profits because of the competitive cost of unskilled manpower 
available in VSIP. It appears that VSIP is best suited for companies with labor-intensive operations as they can tap 
into the vast pool of unskilled labor and rely less on expensive capital. This could explain the predominance of firms 
engaging in low value-added, labor-intensive activities in VSIP. In this arena, the park remains competitive and 
continues to stand out from other locations. 
 
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
The Singapore-affiliated parks in Indonesia, India, China and Vietnam secured a definitive edge over their 
competitors due to the many exclusive and unprecedented privileges accorded to them by host institutions. VSIP, for 
example, was allowed to construct its own telecommunication facilities and power and water treatment plants. This 
on-site suite of facilities was further enhanced by the involvement of local government officials serving on VSIP’s 
Management Board. They were instrumental in facilitating VSIP’s easy access to investment approvals, construction 
activities, import/export permits and immigration matters. Furthermore, Singapore and Vietnam’s robust bilateral 
economic ties, together with strategic partnerships between Singapore’s government-linked companies (GLCs) and 
their Vietnamese counterparts, secured special treatment for the Park. For example, VSIP was able to transcend 
much bureaucracy and upgrade the park surroundings. Amidst an uncertain host environment, VSIP gained a 
reputation as an exceptional investment enclave, boasting reliable infrastructure and special concessions that 
facilitated establishment of operations. Nevertheless, a myriad of issues and challenges prevent VSIP from 
delivering the one-stop service and location-specific advantages it was designed to offer. 
 
Erosion of Location-Specific Advantages 
 
VSIP’s initial advantages of reliable infrastructure facilities were quickly eroded due to improvements in the host 
environment. For example, the unstable national grid soon improved in terms of reliability, negating the benefits of 
the Park’s independent power supply. In order to regain competitiveness, VSIP had to offer tenants the choice 
between the cheaper national grid and its more reliable power facility. The advantages conferred by VSIP’s 
proximity to Ho Chi Minh City, as well as airports and seaports, were also dampened by the widening of the 
highway. Greater accessibility between VSIP and the capital city eventually resulted in congestion as the number of 
users increased. This led to toll fee collections and hence higher operating costs for the park’s tenants. 
 
Heightened Competition 
 
After its inception, VSIP began to face increasing competition as smaller parks offering a similar range of services 
burgeoned in the area. These leaner competitors also offered access to the low-cost labor pool while leasing tenant 
space at much lower rates. Consequently, the high premium VSIP charged to sustain its higher maintenance costs 
became economically unjustifiable for its tenants. Heightened competition, exacerbated by rising overhead costs, 
has diminished the location-specific benefits that were supposed to give VSIP a definitive edge and is likely to mar 
its attractiveness vis-à-vis its potential investors. 
 Political ‘Patronage’ 
 
While reliance on political patronage and personal connections has sometimes eased operations, it has also proved to 
be disadvantageous. The exclusive support and commitment extended by local authorities has not met initial 
expectations. Instead, VSIP has had to contend with additional miscellaneous costs associated with the upgrading of 
the Park’s facilities. This issue is further compounded by a lack of transparency from local administrators and 
endemic corruption5, hampering tenants’ operations in VSIP. 
 
Although deliberate efforts were made to avoid the problems faced in Singapore’s parks in China, the same issues 
have surfaced in VSIP, albeit to a lesser extent. Our on-site interviews, conducted in August 2002, indicate tensions 
culminating from Singapore-styled management practices, as were the case in Suzhou and Wuxi. These strains in 
partnerships have resulted in incongruity in perception, miscommunication and delays, further compromising the 
competitiveness of VSIP. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although the initial blueprints of VSIP as a privileged investment enclave in an uncertain context were promising, 
actual results have indicated their limitations and the early over-optimism over their outcome. While Singapore did 
successfully ‘export’ its expertise in infrastructure and administration, both ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ were subject 
to the social, political and economic environments in Vietnam. Given the shortage of skilled labor, endemic 
corruption and other limitations inherent in the host context, the maintenance of a world-class facility proved costly. 
Furthermore, the park has failed to provide a conducive environment for tenants looking to expand their operations 
to include high value-added activities. Even as a center best suited for labor-intensive low-end manufacturing, VSIP 
has to constantly seek new methods to distinguish itself amidst increasing competition. The less than optimal results 
of Singapore’s industrial park project in Vietnam suggest that the underlying assumption that an investment enclave 
can exist, relatively isolated from the conditions in the host environment is unrealistic. Regardless of the privileges it 
enjoys, VSIP’s success will, to some extent be dependent on external factors. Thus far, an array of indigenous 
conditions, alluded to in this study, have stymied the progress of this privileged foreign investment zone. 
 
 
FOOTNOTES 
 
1
 This paper and three accompanying studies are funded by the Wharton-SMU Research Centre, Singapore 
Management University. 
 
2
 Other members of the consortium include Temasek Holdings, JTC International, UOL Overseas Investments, 
Salim’s KMP Vietnam Investment, LKN Construction, Sembawang Engineering and Mitsubishi Corporation 
(http://www.sedb.com.sg).  
 
3
 The Board, with representatives from the ministries of Trade, Finance and Interior, as well as the General Customs 
Department oversees the issue of investment licenses, import/export permits, and construction permits.  
 
4
 Details are given in Circular No. 8, List of Encouraged, Limited and Prohibited Industries in Export Processing 
Zones and High-Technology Industrial Zones, issued on July 29, 1997. 
 
5
 Transparency International, a global counter-corruption watchdog, ranks Vietnam as the second most corrupt 
country in South-East Asia (after Indonesia). The Vietnamese government itself recently estimated that light-
fingered bureaucrats creamed off at least 20% of the infrastructure spending [2] 
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